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Abstract
Might a nuclear-armed terrorist group or state use ordinary com-
merce to deliver a nuclear weapon by smuggling it in a cargo container
or vehicle? This delivery method would be the only one available to a
sub-state actor, and it might enable a state to make an unattributed
attack. Detection of a weapon or fissile material smuggled in this
manner is difficult because of the large volume and mass available for
shielding. Here I review methods for screening cargo containers to
detect the possible presence of nuclear threats. Because of the large
volume of innocent international commerce, and the cost and disrup-
tion of secondary screening by opening and inspection, it is essential
that the method be rapid and have a low false-positive rate. Shielding
can prevent the detection of neutrons emitted spontaneously or by in-
duced fission. The two promising methods are muon tomography and
high energy X-radiography. If they do not detect a shielded threat
object they can detect the shield itself.
1 Introduction
There are many means of delivering a nuclear device to a target. Advanced
militaries may use aircraft, artillery, cruise missiles or ballistic missiles (either
kind of missile may be launched from land, sea, submarine or air platforms).
Less sophisticated foes may use less sophisticated means, such as civilian
land, sea or air vehicles. These have the advantage that they are not likely to
be recognized as threats and therefore possess the ultimate stealth of hiding
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in plain sight. Even a state may choose to use a civilian delivery system in
order to avoid attribution—it is comparatively easy to track, and determine
the origin of, a military system, but not of a civilian object whose external
characteristics are those of the many millions of vehicles or containers of
innocent commerce.
We first distinguish between radiological dispersal devices and nuclear ex-
plosives. The latter are called nuclear weapons in common parlance, though
they are better defined as supercritical systems in order to include nuclear ex-
plosives nominally intended for civilian engineering purposes, unweaponized
prototypes, developmental or experimental explosives and improvised nu-
clear devices (IND) that might be assembled from diverted fissile material
by groups with limited resources. These two categories have almost nothing
in common.
The enormous number of vehicles and intermodal cargo containers in
innocent commerce (more than 10,000,000 cargo containers enter the U. S.
each year) means that inspection for nuclear materials must be fast and not
introduce significant delays in the flow of commerce. Inspection must not
interfere with the smooth loading and unloading of ships, or the passage of
trains or trucks at ports of lading or entry. The false alarm rate must also
be low, preferably < 0.1% and certainly < 1%, because sending even a few
containers to secondary inspection (opening the container) is disruptive: the
container must be removed from the flow of traffic, taken where it can be
opened and entered, unloaded and inspected, and then, if innocent (as almost
all will be) returned to the logistic system.
Most intermodal containers have interior dimensions of 2.4 m×2.4 m×12
m (40′) or 2.4 m×2.4 m×6 m (20′) and a nominal load limit (for either size)
of 27 metric tons. Heavy trucks and rail cars have similar parameters. This
offers ample room and mass for shielding. The central problem of vehicle
scanning is detecting threat material that is likely to be heavily shielded.
2 Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)
These may be defined as devices to disperse highly radioactive material to
maximize human exposure and contamination of property [1]. The threat lies
in the wide distribution of very strong radiation sources, often only weakly se-
cured. A famous example was the system of unattended navigational beacons
on the Arctic shore of Russia, powered by radioisotope thermal generators
2
(RTG) containing 40,000 Ci of 90Sr (these have been recovered and are no
longer a potential threat).
Strong radiation sources include food and blood irradiators, RTG, sources
used in non-destructive evaluation (NDE; essentially, “X-ray machines” using
nuclear γ-rays) and used reactor fuel awaiting permanent disposal or repro-
cessing. Manufacture of weaker sources in large number (such as americium
smoke detectors, polonium static neutralizers and radiopharmaceuticals) re-
quires a large radioisotope inventory. In some applications, such as irradia-
tors, radioisotopes may be, and are being, replaced by electron beams, but
no substitutes are feasible in other applications.
The most important radioisotopes are 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 192Ir, 210Po, 238Pu
and 241Am. 60Co, 137Cs and 192Ir are strong emitters of penetrating gamma
rays. As a result they require heavy shielding for safe handling (a lesser
issue for a suicide bomber, but even he will require that he not be disabled
before reaching his target). Sufficient radiation to be detected by a sensitive
portal monitor may penetrate even heavy shielding. 90Sr and its short-lived
daughter 90Y are β-emitters, but also emit a significant γ-ray flux by internal
bremsstrahlung [2]. In contrast, 210Po, 238Pu and 241Am are α-particle emit-
ters with very weak or nearly undetectable γ-ray activity, are easily shielded
from portal monitors, and pose little hazard unless in contact with the body.
They are extremely toxic if ingested, with an acute fatal dose of roughly 10
mCi, corresponding to a few µg of short-lived 210Po. Inhaled particles of
α-emitters may produce delayed lung cancer because the local radiation dose
at the particle may be large.
The question of shielding and detectability is complicated by the likeli-
hood that a terrorist will be sloppy, and spill or poorly shield the material
he obtains. Hence, even if he has obtained an α-particle emitter, it may be
readily detectable (and readily contaminate the environment, as was observed
after the poisoning of Litvinenko by 210Po). In fact, α-particle emitters are
notorious for their ability to migrate unless securely sealed, apparently as
a result of scattering by emitted α-particles or the recoiling daughter iso-
topes (the daughters of the principal α-emitters are stable or only weakly
radioactive themselves).
Radioactive material might be dispersed either explosively or non-explosively.
The term “dirty bomb” describes the use of explosives to disperse radioac-
tive material. Non-explosive dispersal would not be a bomb at all, but rather
radioactive poisoning, the poison introduced into the air, water, food supply,
or some other widely distributed medium.
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It is difficult to estimate likely casualties, quite apart from the question
of how much material would be dispersed (are we concerned about 1 Ci, 100
Ci, or 10000 Ci, and of which isotope?). Most estimates of casualties from
explosive dispersal find more fatalities from the explosive itself than from
the radioisotope. People run away from an explosion, minimizing their ex-
posure. Radiopoisoning is likely a greater threat to life because it would not
be detected until the first victims fell sick, generally some time after inges-
tion or exposure, and were correctly diagnosed (radiopoisoning is not what
a physician would consider first when faced with a patient with generalized
malaise or an unusual combination of symptoms) or the radioactivity itself
were detected. Most studies have concluded the larger social impact would
be abandonment of contaminated ground and structures, especially if exac-
erbated by exaggerated public fear of radiation and demands for “maximum
achievable” decontamination without regard to cost. The subject was re-
viewed by Zimmerman and Loeb who describe RDD as “economic weapons”
[1].
Searching for RDD is like looking for lost keys under a lamppost. They
are intrinsically strong sources, handling by amateurs is likely to be sloppy,
and shielding is likely to be incomplete. But they are not a major threat to
human life, and are only a secondary threat to property and the functioning
of a modern society.
3 Fissile Material and Nuclear Explosives
Nuclear explosives may range from highly engineered nuclear weapons (NW)
prepared by a state’s weapons program to improvised nuclear devices (IND)
made by sub-state actors with limited resources, using stolen or diverted
material. Any of these may be a threat; a sophisticated NW may be stolen
or diverted by a sub-state actor (“terrorist group”), or concealed or disguised
as peaceful cargo by a state to defeat or confuse attribution.
Despite the wide possible range of engineering sophistication, all these
have important features in common:
1. They must contain a minimum quantity of fissile material, 235U or
239Pu (other fissile isotopes exist, but in much smaller quantity and are
unlikely to be involved).
2. If successfully detonated, the explosive yield has a characteristic value
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of order 10 kilotons, with the emission of about 0.5 mole/kiloton of
neutrons, production of a large quantity of highly radioactive fission
products, and activation of surrounding material by the neutrons. The
fission product activity at a time t after detonation may be estimated
at 107(t/1 day)−1.2 Ci for t < 6 months [3]. An engineered device may
be designed to produce significantly more or less yield, and an IND
may fizzle, depending on the skill of its designers and builders, but the
characteristic order of magnitude is determined by the fundamental
laws of physics and properties of the materials.
3. Fatalities are likely to be of order 100,000 if detonated in a dense urban
area, as was the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
4. The explosion of a smuggled nuclear weapon or IND would be a surface
burst, producing intense activation and local fallout. This is in con-
trast to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions that were airbursts at
sufficient altitude (600 m) that no surface material was swept up into
the fireball, minimizing activation and fallout.
5. The blast and thermal effects of a surface burst would be reduced, in
comparison to airbursts like those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, because
of shielding (radiation and hydrodynamic) by topographic and cultural
(buildings) features.
Nuclear explosions are the threat with which we must be concerned.
3.1 Signatures
The IAEA has defined “Significant Quantities” of fissile materials. These are
the characteristic quantities (but not quantitative values) of fissile materials
necessary for nuclear explosives. They are set by fundamental physical prop-
erties. The quantities found in actual explosives are necessarily of this order
of magnitude, but need not be equal or close to these values. They determine
the signatures that must be detected when vehicles or cargo containers are
scanned. The Significant Quantity of weapons-grade 239Pu is defined as 8 kg,
and that of highly enriched uranium (HEU; 90% 235U) is defined as 25 kg.
Signatures of fissile materials are of two classes. They are radioactive,
and their emissions may, in principle, be detected. But they also may be
detected by their other properties:
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• High atomic number
• High density:
– α-Pu 19.86 g/cm3
– δ-Pu 15.92 g/cm3
– U 19.1 g/cm3
• In metallic form for nuclear explosives they are likely to be found as
compact masses in order to minimize the escape of neutrons.
Fissile materials are not (in comparison to the isotopes that might be
used in a RDD) very radioactive. The activities of significant quantities are:
• 239Pu
– 500 Ci of α-particle activity. α-particles are completely stopped
(the attenuation is not exponential) by tens of microns of matter,
and effectively undetectable unless the plutonium is dispersed into
contact with a detector.
– 13 mCi of γ-rays. This is the strength of a typical laboratory
source. The spectrum is complex, with several γ-ray energies,
most around 400 KeV, which are readily shielded by a few cm of
lead.
– Of order 30 µCi of neutrons (the value depends on the fraction of
240Pu and the geometry of the source, and is higher for diverted
products of power reactors and lower for high grade weapons ma-
terial). Neutrons are very penetrating, but the source is weak,
and they may be shielded by tens of cm of borated or lithiated
plastic or wax.
• HEU
– 50 mCi of α-particle activity, which is insignificant.
– 30 mCi of low energy (mostly 185 keV), γ-rays that are mostly
absorbed in the uranium itself and readily shielded.
– 1 nCi of neutrons, which is insignificant.
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The spontaneous radioactivity of fissile materials, even in threat quan-
tities, is low, except for their α-activity, which is shielded even by a sheet
of paper or cm of air. Only their neutron emission offers some prospect of
detection.
4 Detection
4.1 Passive
Passive detection is generally easy for RDD but difficult for fissile material.
Here we consider the passive detection of plutonium. The penetrating ra-
dioactivity of HEU is so weak that its passive detection is far beyond the
realm of possibility.
Most (by volume or mass) cargo that enters the United States arrives in
intermodal containers, most of them by sea. Containers crossing our land
borders, unless transshipped from outside the Americas, are not threats,
and transshipped containers from outside the Americas will also have have
undergone long sea voyages. These voyages offer the opportunity to detect
weak sources of radioactivity by integrating signals over long times.
Because neutrons are the most penetrating radioactive emission, we con-
sider the detection of neutrons emitted by plutonium secreted in an inter-
modal shipping container. Fetter, et al. [4] defined a nominal threat: 5 kg of
plutonium emitting 4.5 × 105 n/sec, surrounded by a 50 cm thick spherical
moderating shell of nominal high explosive.
The detector consists of a 1 cm2 silicon photodiode on which is deposited
2µ of 80% enriched 10B boron. This is sandwiched between two 1.75 cm
thick slabs of paraffin moderator. The entire package is just thin enough to
fit in the 3.75 cm deep recesses of the walls of a standard intermodal con-
tainer. Neutrons escaping from the source are moderated by the paraffin;
at thermal energies they have a cross-section of nearly 4000 b for the reac-
tion 10B(n,α)7Li. One of the charged particles will be directed towards the
photodiode and detected with an efficiency that we conservatively take as
25%. The detector is shown in Fig. 1. Such detectors, including processing
circuitry on the silicon substrate, can likely be mass-produced for less than
$10 each, and powered by a 9 V battery.
We suppose three detectors on each 12′ container, spaced so that no point
in the container is more than 3.5 m from a detector, and consider a source at
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No. Features Counts in 106 s
1 Baseline (4.22 cm Pu, 50 cm HE) 340
2 Baseline + 26 innocent containers 1600
3 Innocent container with cosmic rays 0.6
4 27 innocent containers with cosmic rays 1.7
5 Baseline with 50 cm borated CH2 shield 0.08
6 Baseline + shield + 26 innocent containers 0.7
7 No. 3 + shield 0.6
8 No. 4 + shield 1.8
Table 1: Results of Monte Carlo calculations [5] of neutrons detected from a
nominal source plutonium [4] in a cargo container under conditions described
in the text.
the center of the container and a detector half-way up the wall but 3.29 m
displaced along the length of the container, so that it is 3.5 m from the source
and the neutron flux falls obliquely on it. We performed a series of Monte
Carlo calculations with the MCNP code to determine the number of recorded
counts in an integration time of 106 s (about 12 days), corresponding to a
transoceanic voyage with handling and local transportation at each end. The
results are shown in the Table.
The baseline case 1 consists of the nominal source 3.5 m from the de-
scribed 1 cm2 photodiode detector with paraffin moderator and 10B ab-
sorber. Innocent containers, homogeneously filled with 30 tons of FeH, are
in a 3×3×3 cuboidal array, with the source container at the center. FeH is
an approximation to nominal commercial traffic. The heavy nucleus (that
is likely to be some mixture of carbon, oxygen, and metals) has little effect;
the hydrogen moderates and reflects neutrons, increasing the detected flux
roughly five-fold in case 2.
The detection of neutron emission in cases 1 and 2 is highly significant
compared to the background of cosmic ray generated neutrons in cases 3 and
4. The higher signal in case 4 compared to case 3 is an example of the “ship
effect”: interaction of cosmic rays with surrounding matter (ship and cargo)
increases the background. However, anyone sophisticated enough to build a
bomb, even a primitive IND or a shipment of illicitly obtained fissile material,
understands shielding. In cases 5 and 6 the source is surrounded by an
additional 50 cm thick spherical shield of 5% natural boron in paraffin. This
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shielding reduces the signal even below background. That suggests that the
presence of shielding might be detected by the “hole” it leaves in the cosmic
ray produced background. Unfortunately, cases 7 and 8, in which there is no
source, but only the empty shielding shell and the background source, shows
that the shielding does not produce a detectable “hole”, probably because
the shielding reflects neutrons produced outside it. The conclusion is that it
is not possible to detect the neutrons produced by a comparatively strong
but shielded plutonium source. HEU sources are several orders of magnitude
weaker.
These considerations also apply to active interrogation of targets by photofis-
sion or neutron induced fission: Any induced fission neutrons can be absorbed
by shielding, even if the probe penetrates to the fissile material.
4.2 Natural Interrogation—Muons
Cosmic rays interacting with the Earth’s atmosphere produce a downward
flux of muons, mostly µ+, of about 1/cm2-minute at sea level. Their mean
energy is about 3 GeV, with a Lorentz factor of about 30. Muons have a half-
life in their rest frame of 2.2× 10−6 s, or a path length in the atmosphere of
about 20 km, allowing for relativistic time dilation, roughly twice the altitude
at which most of them are produced. They lose energy at a rate of about 2
MeV-cm2/g by ionizing the matter through which they pass, corresponding to
a mean stopping length of about 1500 g/cm2, about 1.5 times the atmospheric
column density. As a result, the more energetic muons penetrate to sea level,
through structures, cargo containers, ships, and any other plausible obstacle,
including threatening pieces of fissile material and shielding. This natural
radiation is a penetrating probe, without any additional exposure or man-
made sources.
Fortunately, although muons are very penetrating, they scatter as they
pass through matter as a result of Coulomb interaction with atomic nuclei.
The r.m.s. scattering angle of a charged particle of speed β ≡ v/c and
momentum p (in GeV/c) after traversing a column density L of a material
of radiation length X (a quantity that is also related to the bremsstrahlung
and pair production by a relativistic electron) is [7]
θ0 =
14
βp
√
L
X
mrad, (1)
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where
X =
716A
Z(Z + 1) ln (287/
√
Z)
g/cm2. (2)
Because of its inverse quadratic dependence on Z, X is much smaller for high-
Z materials than for lower Z materials, and because of their high density the
characteristic length X/ρ is even more sensitive to Z. For example, for
iron X/ρ = 1.86 cm, while for uranium X/ρ = 0.31 cm. Bodies of high-
Z material thus produce a characteristic muon signature of high angular
scattering concentrated in a compact volume.
Tomographic reconstruction is necessary to localize this muon scattering.
The method was invented by Chris Morris [6], and prototypes, up to full scale
for 40′ intermodal containers and tractor-trailer trucks, have been developed
by Decision Sciences International Corp. The tracks of muons are measured
by orthogonal arrays of gas-filled drift tubes as they enter and leave the ve-
hicle or container under inspection, as shown in Fig. 2. Tracks are located to
0.25 mm accuracy by measuring the time at which the ionization they create
in the tubes is collected on the anodes, wires running the lengths of the tubes,
determining the distance of closest approach of the track to the anode. If
the muon is only scattered once in the instrumented volume the tracks will
intersect, to the accuracy of measurement, where it scattered. If all the scat-
tering is concentrated in a small region of space, the incoming and outgoing
tracks will pass through that region. This permits a three-dimensional to-
mographic reconstruction of the distribution of scattering strength, which is
an indicator of the presence of dense bodies of high-Z material.
Muon tomography is remarkable in that it works better in three dimen-
sions than in two. In three dimensions it discriminates against multiple
scatterings that in two dimensions would be erroneously interpreted as a sin-
gle scattering at a location at which no actual scattering took place. This
is illustrated in Fig. 3. In two dimensions any two tracks will intersect, and
it is not possible to distinguish genuine localized scattering at their inter-
section from a trajectory that scattered in more than one place, neither at
the intersection. In three dimensions the entry and exit tracks of a multiply
scattered muon do not, in general, intersect because they are generally not
coplanar, and may be discriminated by these means.
Morris, el al. [6] first demonstrated muon tomography in the laboratory.
They simulated tomographic images of a 10-cm, 19 kg cube of tungsten
(ρ = 19.25 g/cm3, very similar to uranium, but with Z = 74 rather than
92) in a cargo van (Fig. 4). The high-Z material can be detected in one
11
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Figure 2: Muon paths entering and leaving the sensed volume are determined
by timing information from orthogonal arrays of drift tubes. Projection to
their points of closest approach indicates the scattering region. (Decision
Sciences International Corp.)
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E
In three dimensions multiple scattering trajectory tracks AD and EC
are not generally coplanar and do not intersect.  Requiring entry and
exit tracks to intersect selects single scattering events.
In two dimensions multiple scattering at D and E will be interpreted
as a single scattering at B because both paths are consistent with the
same entry and exit tracks.
Figure 3: Muon tomography works better in three than in two dimensions.
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minute of integration, even when placed over the differential and under the
engine block, locations in which it is close to large blocks of confusing iron.
Fig. 4 also shows the power of muon tomography to resolve and discriminate
a variety of innocent cargoes.
Muon tomography has now been demonstrated on prototypes at scales
up to that large enough to accommodate an intermodal cargo container or
tractor-trailer. Fig. 5 shows the detection of mock threat objects in an au-
tomobile, light truck and tractor-trailer.
The fundamental issue in muon tomography is a tradeoff between spa-
tial resolution and integration time because the muon flux is a natural phe-
nomenon and cannot be increased. Higher spatial resolution is required to de-
tect smaller threat objects, increasing the required integration time. Smaller
threats also have shorter muon paths L, reducing the scattering angle θ0.
Morris, et al. [6] present simulated results, including ROC (false positive vs.
false negative) curves showing the tradeoffs.
In mass screening operations, such as at a container port, the flow of
commerce sets an upper bound to the acceptable integration time. Cranes
load and unload ships at a rate of approximately one container every 75
seconds. If the integration time can be held to no more than about 60
seconds screening will not interfere with operations. A container can be
rolled from the unloading crane, placed in the muon tomography chamber,
and rolled out in time for the next container; alternatively, this order can be
reversed in the port of embarkation. Only the very few containers for which a
threat indication is found are removed for secondary inspection from the flow
path. Operationally, minimizing the fraction of apparent positive detections
(probably to below 0.1%) is critical; if this is not done, a screening system
will be considered unacceptable.
Because of the low radioactivity of fissile threats, they may not be sur-
rounded by massive lead shields, unlike the mock threats in Fig. 5. Their
γ-ray activity is low and easily shielded with low- or medium-Z material.
Neutron shields consist of hydrogenous material with a small admixture of
lithium or boron. An IAEA significant quantity (8 kg) of plutonium can be
formed in a sphere 5 cm in radius, and even the significant quantity of HEU
(a 7 cm radius sphere) is less than half the mass of the mock threat used in
the tractor-trailer.
Bare fissile threat objects are harder to detect than massive lead shields
because they are smaller and scatter by smaller angles. The resolution of
the tomographic system needs to be matched to the threat. Scattering by
14
Figure 4: Monte Carlo simulations of a cargo van with: a) A 3-foot stack of
4′ × 8′ sheets of plywood; b) 3.2 MT of miscellaneous plastic, glass and steel
clutter; c) A welding machine including two horizontal 0.75′′ steel plates;
d) Van without cargo but with tungsten cube under engine block; e) Van
without cargo but with tungsten cube over differential. [6]
15
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Figure 5: Detection of mock threat objects by prototype muon tomography
systems. In the car and truck the mock threat was 2 kg of uranium enclosed
in a hollow 5′′ cubic (18 kg) lead shield; in the tractor-trailer it was 6 kg of
uranium enclosed in a hollow 7′′ cubic (58 kg) lead shield. The drift tube
arrays were sized to the vehicles inside, and the larger system required to
accommodate the tractor-trailer has coarser resolution because the muon
paths are longer (Decision Sciences International Corp.)
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an under-resolved object will be spread over a larger voxel and the intense
scattering signature of dense high-Z material will be lost. On the other hand,
over-resolution requires a more expensive detector system with a more drift
tubes and longer integration times to detect a threat with acceptable false
positive and false negative rates.
4.3 Active Interrogation—X-Rays
A cargo container or vehicle may be actively probed with X-rays. Compact
bodies of high-Z material, such as masses of fissile material, have the dis-
tinct X-radiographic signature of strong and spatially localized attenuation.
Attenuation cross-sections as a function of energy are shown in Fig. 6.
Because the cross-sections are large at low energy, radioactive γ-ray sources
(such at 60Co at 1.17 MeV and 1.33 MeV) that are used in routine cargo
screening are not sufficiently penetrating to distinguish fissile threats from the
enormous quantities of medium-Z material in innocent commerce. The best
discrimination between high-Z and medium-Z material is obtained by maxi-
mizing the X-ray energy. This is done by using high energy electrons from a
linear accelerator to make a bremsstrahlung X-ray source on a tungsten tar-
get. The maximum usable electron energy (and X-ray energy) is limited by
the fact that X-rays of energies & 8 MeV photoproduce neutrons within the
target (and elsewhere). These neutrons are emitted roughly isotropically and
are difficult to shield; the optimal electron energy is close to 10 MeV. For rep-
resentative parameters at this energy the exposure of an unshielded operator
at 20 m distance would be about 1µrem per container, or 100 mrem/year
of full-time work at one container per minute, less than natural backgrounds
and 2% of the occupational limit [8].
The optimal irradiation geometry is an obliquely downward fan-beam
produced by a bremsstrahlung source above the vehicle or container to be
scanned, detected by a line of collimated detectors (scintillators enclosed
in cylindrical holes oriented towards the X-ray source in a thick slab of lead
absorber) below the vehicle. The vehicle or container would be pulled through
the radiographic system by a chain or conveyor (as in a car-wash), without a
driver inside. At a representative electron accelerator pulse rate of 100/s, a
40′ container can be scanned in 12 seconds with an along-track resolution of
1 cm. A linear array of 260 detectors, NaI(Tl) scintillators measuring total
deposited energy per pulse, provides 1 cm cross-track resolution at readily
achievable pulse strengths [8].
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Figure 6: Attenuation cross-sections per atom. The cross-section at 5 MeV
for high-Z material (uranium, plutonium) is an order of magnitude higher
than for medium-Z (iron), the attenuation per unit length is about four
times as large and per gm/cm2 about twice as large. These ratios increase
with increasing X-ray energy because of the increase in pair production by
higher-Z nuclei. The cross-sections enter in an exponent with a fairly large
multiplier, so even small differences are important. For example, 8 cm of
δ-plutonium attenuates 5 MeV X-rays by a factor of 0.0029 but the same
thickness of iron attenuates them by only a factor of 0.14, fifty times less.
(t2.lanl.gov)
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This geometry, shown in Fig. 7, has several advantages. Downward il-
lumination avoids false positive signals from end-on rod stock, long ingots,
railroad axles, shafts and similar long slender steel objects because these will
be laid horizontally on the floor. The earth acts as a beam-stop, minimiz-
ing the X-radiation dose to the surroundings (the operator can be remote, if
necessary). Oblique illumination avoids false positives from long slender ver-
tical columns, and the use of two intersecting oblique illumination directions
permits localization of suspect objects andi verification of their compactness
in three dimensions [9].
The results of X-radiography of the configuration of Fig. 7, as computed
by the MCNPX Monte Carlo code, are shown in Fig. 8. Details are given in
[8]. The compact high-Z fissile object (a 5 kg plutonium sphere) is apparent,
and readily distinguished from the clutter, even though the total attenua-
tion through the clutter may exceed that through the threat object. Threat
objects are distinguished by the combination of their high attenuation and
compact size.
It is possible to surround fissile material with shielding so thick and
opaque that insufficient X-rays penetrate to reveal what is inside. 40 cm
of full-density iron (two diameters of the half-density spheres seen in Figs. 7
and 8 are sufficient). However, such heavy shielding would be evident in
X-radiography and would be a signal that secondary inspection is necessary.
Such large compact single masses of medium- or high-Z material are rare in
innocent commerce; when many tons of metal are shipped, they are usually
distributed as smaller bodies across the floor of the container.
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Figure 7: Geometry of X-radiography of container. The 40′ container shown
contains a 5 kg sphere of plutonium and 30 MT of half-density iron spheres
of 20 cm radius, representing automobile engine blocks or similar medium-Z
clutter.
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Data
Figure 8: X-radiograph of 5 kg plutonium sphere with clutter of 30 MT of
20 cm radius half-density iron spheres in 40′ containers. The compact peak
of attenuation unambiguously indicates the presence of a compact high-Z
object, a characteristic signature of a fissile threat. X-irradiation is 13◦ from
vertical so the absorption maximum is displaced horizontally from the sphere.
The zero of the attenuation scale is arbitrary [8].
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